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I. Introduction
Excessive risk taking by the CEOs of large nancial cooperations is widely believed to have
played a great role in the economic and nancial crisis of 2008-2009 (Blinder, 2009). Of the
executives and commentators surveyed in the nancial services sector, 73% consider excessive
risk taking to be one of the crucial factors that triggered the crisis (PricewaterhouseCoop-
ers 2008). G-20 leaders announced their commitment in legislating the necessary changes
to minimize excessive risk taking. The Basel II framework has been amended to account
for motives to take excessive risk. The Dodd-Frank Act prohibited certain compensation
arrangements in order to discourage inappropriate risk taking by nancial institutions in the
US. What motivates managers to take excessive risk? In this paper, we argue that a CEOs
career concerns regarding potential termination give her incentive to make the output of her
rm as uninformative as possible about her managerial ability. We show that a CEO can
achieve this goal by taking excessive risks (i.e., a risk level higher than the socially optimal
risk level) while overseeing the rm and that explicit incentives provided by optimal linear
compensation contracts cannot prevent CEOs from taking such excessive risks.
We build a principal-agent framework in which a (risk-neutral) rm operates for two
periods. We initially assume that there are two types of (risk-neutral) CEOs, high- and
low-ability, who are equally likely in the population. All else being equal, the rm produces
higher output when managed by a high-ability CEO. No one, including the CEO herself,
knows the ability of the CEO. The output of the rm is also inuenced by the privately
known risk level chosen by the CEO. In the end, the rm may land in one of two possible
states (good or bad) and pays the optimal linear compensation contract that allows for
any combination of xed wages and stocks. The novel results of our paper stem from the
structure in which CEOs implicitly choose the probability of states by deciding on the risk
level. In particular, by her choice of risk, a CEO can increase the probability of the bad
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states occurance, as well as the amount of returns in the good state and loss in the bad one.
If the rm believes that the ability of the CEO is below average at the end of the rst
period, it res her and hires a new CEO, whose ability is expected to be average in the
population. This layo¤ risk is the source of the CEOs career concerns.1 By adjusting the
risk level, a CEO can overlap possible outputs produced by high- and low-ability CEOs in
di¤erent state realizations. When the rm observes the overlapped output, it cannot know
exactly which ability type in fact produced this output. Because the probability of the bad
state increases with risk, if a CEO overlaps the outputs by taking excessive risk, then the
rm believes that the overlapped output is more likely to be the bad-state realization of a
high-ability CEO than the good-state realization of a low-ability CEO. Consequently, the
rms expectation about the CEOs ability will be higher than average even though each type
is ex ante equally likely, which means that the CEO is not red in such an output realization.
Moreover, her type is inferred if she turns out to be a high-ability CEO in the good state
and thus she is not red in this state realization, either. By following this strategy, she is
red only if she turns out to be a low-ability CEO in the bad state.2
We show that the strategy of overlapping the outputs by taking excessive risk minimizes
the probability of being red when the di¤erence between the two possible abilities is neither
too high nor too low. Yet, a risk level that minimizes the probability of being red is not
automatically an equilibrium. It is an equilibrium when the CEOs compensation benet
1. It is noteworthy that risk-taking decisions interact with layo¤ risk and compensation incentives in
practice. Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) empirically show that layo¤ risk and compensation e¤ects matter
in managersrisk-taking decisions. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) mention that avoiding a possible layo¤ is
the most important career concern. Other papers supporting this hypothesis include Fama (1980), Jensen
and Murphy (1990), Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997), Bloom and Milkovich (1998), Mehran, Nogler, and
Schwartz (1998), Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998), Eckbo and Thorburn (2003), Hong and Kubik (2003),
Clarke and Subramanian (2006), Chakraborty, Sheikh, and Subramanian (2007), and Larraza-Kintana et al.
(2007). The literature also shows that CEO turnover is closely related to the peer performance (Gibbons
and Murphy 1990; DeFond and Park 1999; Kaplan and Minton 2011).
2. An interesting property of our model is that, contrary to standard career concerns models à la Holm-
strom (1982/1999), in which the manager is trapped in taking the expected action (i.e., supplying e¤ort), in
our case, it is the rm who is trapped in forming the correct expectation about the probability of the states
and the equilibrium risk choice. Thus, as opposed to the common policy debates, making the risk choice
more transparent may not solve excessive risk taking.
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she derives by taking optimal risk in the rst period is dominated in expected payo¤ by
the career benet she derives by taking excessive risk to minimize her probability of being
red. In such a case, excessive risk taking occurs in equilibrium under the optimal linear
compensation contract. This sheds light on the ongoing debate about the (desperate) role
of regulation of compensation structures to prevent excessive risk taking.
Policy debates emphasize the CEOsresponsibility in the ine¢ ciently high levels of risk
taken by large nancial corporations. Yet, we show that, in addition to cases in which the
rm involuntarily allows the CEO to take excessive risk, there are also cases in which it
voluntarily allows her to take excessive risk. In the former case, the rm involuntarily allows
the CEO to take excessive risk because no compensation contract, not even providing the
whole return of the project to the CEO, can achieve the optimal risk level. However, in
the latter case, although having the CEO take the optimal risk could be protable for the
rm, letting her take excessive risk is even more protable. This is ine¢ cient from the point
of view of society, as the return from excessive risk has negative net present value. Thus,
shareholders sometimes share the responsibility of ine¢ cient levels of risk in the rm.
Our results hold even when CEOs are risk averse. We further show that excessive risk
taking persists even when there is a continuum of ability types. This case also illustrates
an inverse U-shaped relationship between the unobserved ability of the CEO and her layo¤
risk. Among the below-average CEOs, a higher-ability one is more likely to be red than a
lower-ability one, while above-average CEOs face no layo¤ risk. Finally, we show that our
results are robust to changes in informational assumptions by illustrating the persistence
of excessive risk in equilibrium when CEOs privately know their types. Our explanation
for excessive risk taking is not limited-liability based, as there is no limited liability for the
CEO in the model. That is, in our setting, a CEO does not take higher risks simply because
limited liability protects her from downward risks, which is already a well-known explanation
in the literature. As a matter of fact, incorporating limited liability to our setting would
increase CEOsrisk appetite.
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We now explain how our paper relates to prior work. A large body of literature, pioneered
by Fama (1980) and Holmstrom (1982/1999), analyzes how career concerns a¤ect the behav-
ior of agents. Holmstrom (1982/1999) nds that, since investing in a project carries the risk
of ones type being discovered, a risk-averse manager behaves overly conservatively by not
investing in risky projects at all. Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986) elaborate on this idea
further and show that conservatism can be xed if the shareholders can o¤er a downward
rigid wage. Building on Holmstroms ndings, the literature that followed has focused on
managerial conservatism in a broad sense (see, e.g., Narayanan [1985], Stein [1988], Shleifer
and Vishny [1989], Hirshleifer and Thakor [1992], Milgrom and Roberts [1992], Zwiebel
[1995], Nohel and Todd [2005], and Malcomson [2011]). Contrary to this literature, we show
that managers (even risk-averse ones) have an incentive to take excessive risks if their risk
choices inuence the probabilities of di¤erent states.
Some papers focus on the possibility of signaling of managerial ability. Huberman and
Kandel (1993) analyze the reputation concerns of money managers who might possibly over-
invest in a risky asset to signal their ability. Huddart (1999) shows that an explicit perfor-
mance fee may mitigate excessive risk taking of investment advisors who have reputational
concerns. Unlike the signaling literature, in our setting the CEO is trying not to aunt her
type but to rather add noise to the markets inferences about it. In that sense, our mecha-
nism is closer to the signal-jamming literature, in which the agent tries to jam the signal
about her type (Fudenberg and Tirole 1986).
The recent literature on CEO turnover analyzes the impact of performance risk on the
rms ability to infer the unknown ability of its CEO. For example, Bushman, Dai, and
Wang (2010) analyze whether rm-specic or systematic risk increases turnover in a setting
where risk is exogenous. Instead, we look at the implications of CEO turnover for risk taking
when both the risk choice of the CEO and the turnover decision of the rm are endogenous.
Hu et al. (2011) nd a U-shaped relationship between the managers risk choice and her
prior relative performance among her peers. We nd a similar inverse U-shaped relationship
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between the CEOs ability and her layo¤ risk. In our setting, while above-average CEOs face
no layo¤ risk, among below-average ones, lower-ability CEOs have lower layo¤ risk than do
higher-ability ones.
The type of statistical bias that managers try to add into the markets inference about
their unknown abilities appears in various ways in the literature. In Milbourn, Shockley,
and Thakor (2001), in order to alter the markets assessment about her ability, the man-
ager distorts the probabilities of reputational states that are observed and not observed by
overly investigating potential projects. In Scharfstein and Stein (1990), the motivation of
the manager is to minimize reputational risk by following the crowd. The closest in spirit
to our paper is Hermalin (1993), which shows that a manager can decrease the variance of
the posterior estimate of her ability by choosing the riskiest project in terms of variance,
as a result of which the principal puts more weight on his prior assessment of the CEOs
ability. In our setting, rather than changing the weights on assessments, the CEO changes
the posterior assessment itself. Moreover, in Hermalin (1993), the risk-neutral principal is
actually indi¤erent between any risk choices (a risk-neutral manager would also be indi¤er-
ent). Thus, there is no incentive problem, while in ours, there is a moral hazard in choosing
the risk and the rm tries to enhance e¢ ciency with optimal linear contracts.
This paper is the rst to show that CEOs (or managers in general) can improve markets
expectation about their abilities by taking too high risks, even when they do not know their
own abilities. Therefore, CEOs may have strong career-related incentives to take excessive
risk. Our structure is novel in that we allow CEOs to choose the probabilities of occur-
rence of various states, implicitly by choosing the risk level in overseeing the rm. Such a
mechanism does not appear in the literature. Contrary to many papers, we show that any
linear combination of xed wage and stocks can do little to prevent excessive risk taking.
We distinguish between excessive risk taking against the will of the rm and that with its
consent.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the model. Section III analyzes
the case in which the CEOs managerial ability is unknown but the risk level chosen by them
is privately known. Section IV extends the two-type analysis of the previous sections to a
continuum of types. Section V goes back to the two-type world but extends the model in
another dimension by assuming that CEOs privately know their managerial abilities. Section
VI concludes. An (online) appendix contains further details and proofs.
II. The Model
We consider a unit mass of risk-neutral CEOs, each of whom may potentially be employed
by a risk-neutral rm. CEOs di¤er in their innate managerial ability, which is represented
by i, where i = fH;Lg and L < H . A CEO with a managerial ability of L (H) is called
a low-ability (high-ability) CEO. Each type is equally likely in the population, and thus the
average ability of a CEO is  := (H + L)=2. No one, including the CEO herself, knows the
type of a CEO, but the distribution of types in the population is common knowledge. Thus,
all parties, including the CEO herself, hold identical prior beliefs over managerial ability.
Given her managerial ability, she chooses a privately known risk level while overseeing the
rm, r 2 [0; 1].3 There is no borrowing and lending, and neither the rm nor the CEOs
discount future payo¤s.
The rm operates for two periods, t = f1; 2g. The output of the rm in any period is
determined by both the managerial ability of and the risk choice by its current CEO.4 If a
CEO of managerial ability i chooses a risk level of rt in period t, then the realized output
3. In Holmstrom (1982/1999), Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986), and Hermalin (1993), observability
of project riskiness and risk aversion are crucial to the obtained results. In our setting, we do not need to
assume that risk choice is unobservable as long as CEOs do not know their abilities because the market
correctly predicts this anyway. However, this assumption will be crucial in the asymmetric information case
in which CEOs privately know their abilities and each type chooses di¤erent risk levels in equilibrium.
4. This specication is consistent with the evidence showing that not only the managerial ability (Chevalier
and Ellison 1997; Sirri and Tufano 1998; Del Guercio and Tkac 2002; Falato, Li, Milbourn 2010) but also
the managerial style (in our case the risk choice) (Bertrand and Schoar 2003) matter in the rm.
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of the rm, yt (i; rt), is
(1) yt (i; rt) =
8><>: i   f (rt) with probability rti + f (rt) with probability 1  rt;
where f(rt) is an increasing, concave, and twice-continuously di¤erentiable risk-return func-
tion with f(0)  0. We keep this technological specication xed throughout the paper.
The reservation payo¤ of a CEO per period is u, which satises 0 < u  L. Thus, the rm
may nd it protable to hire a CEO by paying at least her reservation payo¤.
The expected output of the rm in period t, E[yt], is5
(2) E [yt (i; rt)] = i + (1  2rt) f (rt) 8t = f1; 2g ; 8i = fH;Lg :
Given the managerial ability, we interpret this technology as a collection of investment
projects with di¤erent risk and return pairs resulting in di¤erent expected values for each
project. In a large number of papers, the choice is between a risky and a riskless project. Our
specication is a generalization of this assumption to many projects. With this specication,
an increase in risk increases the output in the good state, the loss in the bad state, and the
probability of the bad state.6 Hence, there is an optimal risk level rt < 1 that maximizes the
expected output of the rm. Although not universal, such a risk specication makes good
sense in many real-life situations, especially in those involving risky nancial investments.7 In
5. The assumption that i enters the production technology linearly is quite common in the literature and
it is assumed only for simplicity. One can generalize the analysis by having E[yt(i; rt)] = g(i)+(1 2rt)f(rt),
and this does not change the qualitative results as long as g(i) is an increasing function.
6. The specication that the probability of the bad state is increasing in risk level is crucial in our setting.
Our results hold as long as the risk-return function is not convex or the state realizations are not asymmetric
in favor of the bad state. Moreover, they are independent of the fraction of types in the population as long
as the population is not entirely composed of just one type.
7.Our denition combines various attributes of risk that can be seen in the literature. As Sanders and
Hambrick (2007) discuss in quite detail, risk is measured di¤erently in di¤erent papers. Making larger
bets, investing in bets that have more extreme potential outcomes or bets that have higher likelihood
of extreme losses are the three major indicators of increased risk taking. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)
unambigously dene risk as mean-preserving spreads (i.e., moving the probability density from the center
to the tails of the distribution while keeping the expected return xed). However, many real life situations
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fact, our specication is very similar to Palomino and Prats (2003) technology specication
in that an investment project is uniquely dened by its expected value and some kind of risk
measure rt which does not need to correspond to variance. We now dene what we mean by
excessive risk taking.
Definition 1 (Excessive risk taking) A CEO who chooses a risk level of rt is said to
be taking excessive risk i¤ rt > rt .
In fact, what we nd will be even stronger than this. We show that the expected risk-
return function, (1   2rt)f(rt), is negative valued at the equilibrium excessive risk level.
That is, the CEO chooses so high a risk level that it is not only higher than the optimal risk
level but also results in negative expected return from the contribution of risk to the output.
Thus, she chooses a negative NPV project in equilibrium in terms of risk, but her expected
managerial ability covers the expected loss due to excessive risk taking, so that the rm may
still want to operate.
Contracting between the rm and the CEO is fairly simple. We assume that the rm is
not able to o¤er two-period contracts.8 Thus, in each period, the rm o¤ers the CEO an
individually rational and incentive-compatible compensation contract. We restrict our at-
tention to linear contracts, as they are most frequently observed in practice and well justied
in theory (for example, by Holmstrom and Milgrom [1987]). The realized compensation of
involve choosing between projects with di¤erent means, as we have in our setting. Using variance as a risk
measure in such settings is certainly not ideal, as Hart and Foster (2009) argue in detail. Using second-order
stochastic dominance (SOSD) is not ideal, either, because it provides only partial ordering as the dominating
distribution must have at least as high a mean as the dominated one. Though, our risk measure is consistent
with SOSD when the latter is able to make comparisons. It is also consistent with Domar and Musgraves
(1944) probability-of-loss-based risk index. Moreover, our risk measure results in the same order with Value
at Risk (VaR) and Semivariance measures of risk when the required thresholds for failure in these risk
measures are set to zero. Given the technological specications, our risk measure is coherent in the sense
that it satises monotonicity, subadditivity, positive homogeneity, and translation invariance axioms dened
in Artzner et al. (1999).
8. This is a standard assumption in career concern models (Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Hermalin 1993;
Dasgupta and Prat 2006; Bushman, Dai, and Wang 2010). Hermalin (1993) argues that it is usually infeasible
to commit fully to employ the manager at a prespecied compensation in the future. Moreover, if there were
signaling considerations, those who have low abilities would be those who demand such contracts. Thus, to
signal her type, a high-ability CEO would not want to get such a long-term contract.
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the CEO in period t, wt, is given by
(3) wt (at; bt; yt (i; rt)) = at + btyt (i; rt) 8t = f1; 2g ; 8i = fH;Lg ;
where at  0 and bt are compensation parameters. If bt = 0 and at > 0 in equilibrium,
then the contract is a xed-wage contract, and if bt > 0 and at = 0, then it provides stock
ownership only. All other combinations involve both a xed wage and stock ownership
simultaneously.9
Because the CEOs managerial ability is unobserved, the rst-period output of the rm is
a predictor of her future productivity. Hence, her layo¤risk in the second period is inuenced
by the realized output in the rst period, which is inuenced by her risk choice. This creates
the CEOs career concern in our setting and results in a misalignment between her and the
rms preferences. The CEO maximizes her two-period expected compensation by choosing
the risk level in each period, while the rm engages in period-by-period maximization and
makes a ring decision in between the two periods, if necessary, upon updating its beliefs
based on the rst-period output realization.
The sequence of events is as follows. At the beginning of the rst period, the rm signs
a contract with a CEO that species her compensation in this period. Upon employment,
the CEO decides how to oversee the rm by choosing a risk level r1. Then, the rst-period
output y1 is realized. The rm pays w1 to the CEO, updates its beliefs about her managerial
ability based on the realized output, and decides whether to re her. We call a CEO who
is hired again in the second period an old CEO; and if the rm hires a new CEO in the
second period, we call her a new CEO. Depending on its ring decision, at the beginning
of the second period, the rm signs a new compensation contract with either the old or a
9. For simplicity, we rule out stock-option-based compensation. If we allow for stock options in addition
to stocks, the incentives will be even more skewed toward excessive risk taking (see, e.g., Lambert [1986],
Ju, Leland, and Senbet [2003], Mehran and Rosenberg [2007], Raviv and Landskroner [2009], Dong, Wang,
and Xie [2010]). Moreover, as Murphy (1999) mentions in his well-known review of executive compensation,
stock ownership is the most direct way of aligning the preferences of CEOs and shareholders.
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new CEO. The CEO chooses a risk level r2 for the second period. Finally, the second-period
output y2 is realized, the CEO is paid w2, and the rm is dissolved.
As a benchmark, we rst characterize the complete information setting in which both the
managerial ability and the risk choice of the CEOs are observable. Obviously, the rm wants
to employ a high-ability CEO, and this CEO has no career concern as there is no risk of being
red. As a result, we can obtain the optimal risk level rt from the joint surplus maximization,
maxrtfE[yt(H ; rt)]g, whose rst-order condition yields 2f(rt) = (1  2rt)f 0(rt), from which
we can easily see that the optimal risk level satises rt < 1=2 in any interior solution.
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The CEO earns just her reservation payo¤ in expected terms in the optimal compensation
contact, which may involve xed wage and stock ownership in various combinations.
III. Symmetric-Incomplete Information
In the symmetric-incomplete information setting, neither the CEO nor the rm knows the
type of the CEO, and only the CEO knows the risk level that she chooses while overseeing
the rm. We proceed backwards to solve the model. The next subsection analyzes the second
period and shows that the CEO, whether new or old, chooses the optimal risk level in the
second period because she no longer has any career concern in this period as the rm will be
dissolved after that. It also shows that the rm res a CEO at the end of the rst period if
and only if, upon observing the rst-period output, it believes that the CEOs ability is less
than the average ability in the population. The subsection following the next analyzes the
rst period and shows that excessive risk taking can be an equilibrium when the di¤erence
between the abilities is neither too high nor too low.
10. The second-order condition,  4f 0(rt) + f 00(rt)(1  2rt)  0, holds for all rt < 1=2.
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III.A. The Second Period
This subsection derives the rms optimal ring rule and the risk level that a CEO chooses
in the second period. Because the CEO has no career concern in the second period, the
problem that the rm faces is a standard moral hazard problem whose solution leaves no
surplus to the CEO, who eventually chooses the optimal risk.
The rm maximizes expected output net of expected CEO compensation subject to the
individual rationality constraint, which guarantees that the CEO nds it better to sign the
compensation contract than to pursue her outside option, and the incentive compatibility
constraint, which guarantees that the rms maximization problem is consistent with the
risk choice that results from the CEO maximization problem. The incentive compatibility
constraint is given by
(4) r2 2 arg max
r^2
E [a2 + b2 ( + (1  2r^2) f (r^2))] :
The CEO does not know her ability but rationally expects it to be  if she is a new CEO.
If she is an old CEO, then all terms are conditional on the rst-period output realization.
Thus, her type is expected to be ~ := E[i j y1(; r1)], which is her expected ability given
the rst-period output y1(; r1).
Because the expected compensation is a concave function of r2 for its positive range, we
can comfortably replace the incentive compatibility constraint with its rst-order condition.
Yet, this rst-order condition is exactly the same as the rst-order condition of the complete
information setting as long as the compensation contract includes some stock ownership
(i.e., b2 > 0). Hence, the CEO, whether new or old, chooses the optimal risk level r2
in equilibrium.11 The rm adjusts the compensation parameters such that the individual
rationality constraint binds in equilibrium and the CEO gets exactly her reservation payo¤,
11.When b2 = 0, the CEO is indi¤erent between any risk levels, including the optimal one. Thus, the rm
wants to o¤er some stock in equilibrium.
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u, in expected terms. This analysis leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Risk choice in the second period) The CEO, whether old or new,
chooses the optimal risk level r2 in the second period.
CEOs do not have career concerns in the second period because the rm is dissolved at
the end of this period. Hence, this proposition predicts that the preferences of CEOs who
are closer to end of their careers to be more in line with the preferences of the shareholders.
The results in the literature about changes in managersbehavior as their careers evolve are
somewhat mixed. Avery and Chevalier (1999) argue that risk taking increases over time as
the manager becomes more condent in her abilities. Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Hong,
Kubik, and Solomon (2000), and Lamont (2002) provide some evidence for this. Prendergast
and Stole (1996) argue the opposite, and Graham (1999) provides evidence in favor of this
opposing view.
An obvious but important corollary of the above ndings is that if the solution of the
rms maximization problem yields lower prots with ~ than with , the rm res the old
CEO and hires a new one.12 This leads to the optimal ring rule.
Corollary 1 (Optimal firing rule) The rm res the old CEO and hires a new one
in the second period i¤ ~ < .
This ring rule is consistent with Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994, 1998), Hermalin and
Weisbach (1998, forthcoming), Renée and Ferreira (2007), and Bushman, Dai, and Wang
12. The implicit assumption here is that the reservation payo¤ of the CEO, u, remains unchanged despite
the fact that beliefs about her type are updated based on the rst-period output. In reality, this reservation
payo¤may adjust (see the arguments in Holmstrom [1982/1999] and Gibbons and Murphy [1992]). Following
Bushman, Dai, and Wang (2010), we assume for simplicity that there is downward rigidity in the reservation
payo¤s because managerial ability is rm specic and valuable only within the organization. Nonetheless,
excessive risk taking is possible even when reservation payo¤s get updated in response to changes in beliefs
about managerial ability. In such a case, a managers future compensation is still an increasing function of
rms expectation about her ability, and as we show in the text, a manager can increase markets expectation
about her ability by taking excessive risk.
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(2010), in all of which the CEO is red if the assessment about her ability is below a
particular threshold.
III.B. The First Period
This subsection shows the possibility of excessive risk taking in the rst period. The optimal
ring rule that we derive in the previous subsection says that the rm keeps the old CEO if
and only if ~  . Thus, the CEO has an incentive to inuence the markets belief in her
ability by her choice of risk. This is in her best interest if the benet of decreasing her layo¤
risk is greater than her loss from compensation due to choosing a risk level di¤erent from
the optimal risk.
We now derive the CEOs probability of being red at the end of the rst period, p.
Because there are two types (high and low) and two states (good and bad) in the model,
there are four possible state realizations for any given risk level. If the CEO chooses the
optimal risk level r1, the rm infers her actual ability upon observing the output, unless by
chance outputs coincide at this risk level in any two state realizations.13 Then, high-ability
CEOs are red with probability zero while low-ability ones are red with probability one.
Given that each type is equally likely in the population, the ex ante probability of being
red is 1=2.
Similarly, the rm infers the actual ability of the CEO upon observing the output for
any risk level at which the outputs do not overlap for any state realization of the two types.
Hence, high-ability CEOs are red with probability zero while low-ability ones are red with
probability one. Then, once again, the ex ante probability of being red is 1=2. This means
that, given any positive amount of stock ownership, r1 dominates any such risk level, because
the CEO faces the same probability of being red even when she chooses r1 but receives a
13. Because the optimal risk level is less than 1=2, the expectation about the CEOs ability will be below
average when outputs coincide at the optimal risk level by chance. Then, the probability of being red will
be higher than 1=2.
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higher rst-period compensation by doing so.
So, which risk level does a CEO choose in equilibrium? To answer this, we need to
consider three cases in terms of the di¤erence between the abilities. The rst case is the
case in which even the bad-state output of a high-ability CEO is higher than the good-
state output of a low-ability CEO for all risk choices and so outputs cannot overlap. This
occurs when H   f(1)  L + f(1) or when the di¤erence between the abilities is high (i.e.,
H   L  2f(1)). This is because if this inequality holds, then it should strictly hold for
all r1 2 [0; 1) as f() is an increasing function. In this case, the rm is able to infer the
actual ability of a CEO for all possible output realizations, and thus the probability of being
red is independent of CEOs risk choice and equal to 1=2. Then, again, given any positive
amount of stock ownership, r1 dominates all other risk choices as it involves the same layo¤
risk with higher rst-period compensation. The following lemma records this result.
Lemma 1 (Case 1) When the di¤erence between the abilities is high (i.e., H L  2f(1)),
the CEO chooses the optimal risk, r1 < 1=2, in equilibrium. Her probability of being red is
1=2.
In the second case, the di¤erence between the abilities is intermediate (i.e., 2f(1=2) 
H   L < 2f(1)). Now, by choosing the risk level r1 = f 1((H   L)=2), the CEO is
able to overlap the bad-state output when she turns out to be a high-ability CEO with the
good-state output when she turns out to be a low-ability CEO (i.e., H f(r1) = L+f(r1)).
If the rm observes this overlappedoutput level, it is not certain about which type could
have produced this output. Then, the conditional expectation on the type of the CEO is
(5) E [i j y1] = (1  r1) L + r1H :
Because 1=2  f 1((H   L)=2), we know that r1  1=2; this in turn implies E[i j y1]  .
Therefore, the rm keeps the CEO in the rm when it observes this overlapped output.
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Outputs do not coincide in the remaining state realizations, the CEOs type is perfectly
inferred, and as a result the high-ability ones are retained while the low-ability ones are red.
Consequently, the probability of being red is p = Pr f = LgPr fy1 = L   f (r1)g = r1=2,
which is denitely less than 1=2, the probability of being red when the CEO chooses a
di¤erent risk level, and so the outputs do not overlap for any two state realizations.
Choosing r1 minimizes the probability of being red but it is not automatically an equi-
librium. By choosing this risk level rather than the optimal risk level, the CEO is minimizing
her layo¤ risk in the second period, but, she is now o¤ered lower compensation in the rst
period because she did not choose the optimal risk level. For now, we report r1 as the risk
level that minimizes the layo¤ risk, but later we derive the conditions under which it becomes
an equilibrium.
Lemma 2 (Case 2) When the di¤erence between the abilities is intermediate (i.e., 2f(1=2) 
H   L < 2f(1)), the risk level that minimizes the probability of being red is equal to
(6) r1 = f 1

H   L
2

 1
2
;
which is an excessive risk level. In this case, the probability of being red is r1=2.
Finally, in the third case, the di¤erence between the abilities is low (i.e., 0 < H   L <
2f(1=2)). Let us rst consider the interval 2f(0) < H   L < 2f(1=2). Following the
reasoning we have in Case 2, we obtain (5) once again when the CEO chooses to overlap the
outputs. However, this time E[i j y1] <  in such a case. She keeps her job only when she
turns out to be a high-ability CEO who lands in the good state. Thus, when she overlaps
the outputs, her probability of being red is p = 1  Pr f = Hg  Pr fy1 = H + f (r1)g =
(1+r1)=2, which is higher than 1=2, the probability of being red when she chooses a di¤erent
risk level, and so the outputs do not overlap for any two state realizations. This suggests that
in this case, given any positive amount of stock ownership, r1 dominates all other risk choices,
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including r1.14 In the remaining part of the interval of case 3 (i.e., 0 < H   L  2f(0))
outputs do not match in any way and thus the probability of being red cannot be any lower
than 1=2, which implies that she chooses the optimal risk level.
Lemma 3 (Case 3) When the di¤erence between the abilities is low (i.e.,0 < H   L <
2f(1=2), the CEO chooses the optimal risk, r1 < 1=2, in equilibrium. Her probability of
being red is 1=2.
In sum, the CEO chooses the optimal risk in equilibrium when the di¤erence between the
abilities is high or low, but when the di¤erence between the two abilities is intermediate she
may choose a risk level at which the bad-state output of a high-ability CEO coincides with the
good-state output of a low-ability CEO. This strategy decreases the outputs informativeness
about the CEOs ability, which in turn minimizes her layo¤ risk. Of course, for this to be
an equilibrium, it must also be in her best interest to do so, which we focus on next.
In the rest of this subsection, we analyze possible equilibrium risk levels when the di¤er-
ence between the abilities is intermediate. According to Lemma 2, if the CEO chooses r1,
then her probability of being red is r1=2. If she chooses any other risk level, her probability
of being red is 1=2. Then, she is better o¤ choosing the optimal risk level r1 among all
these possible risk levels because her probability of being red is still 1=2 but her rst-period
compensation is higher. This means that r1 always dominates all other risk choices, except
r1, given any positive amount of stock ownership. Thus, the CEOs choice in Case 2 is
between r1 and r1 only.
The rms maximization problem is the same as in the second period, except now it
includes an additional constraint. If the rm wants the CEO to choose the optimal risk
level, it must compensate the forgone expected payo¤ that comes from increased layo¤ risk
14. If outputs match by chance at the optimal risk level, then the CEO chooses a risk level arbitrarily close
to the optimal risk level.
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by not choosing r1. We call this constraint the career concern constraint, which is given by
(CC) E

w1
 
a1; b1; y1
 
; r1

+
u
2
 E w1  a1; b1; y1  ; r1+ (2  r1)u
2
if r1 6= r1:
The left-hand side of this constraint is the expected payo¤ of the CEO if she chooses r1
and the right-hand side is that if she chooses r1. This constraint is derived as follows. If
the CEO chooses r1, her probability of keeping her job in the second period, in which she
always obtains her reservation payo¤ u, is (2  r1)=2. Therefore, her second-period expected
payo¤ is [(2  r1)u]=2 if she chooses r1 in the rst period. Adding her expected rst-period
compensation to this term yields the right-hand side of the inequality. If she chooses the
optimal risk level r1, the probability of keeping her job in the second period is 1=2; hence, her
expected payo¤ is u=2 in the second period. Adding her expected rst-period compensation
to this term yields the left-hand side of the inequality.
Reorganizing the career concern constraint after employing the linear compensation con-
tract assumption gives
(CC) (1  2r1) f (r1)  (1  2r1) f (r1) 
(1  r1)u
2b1
:
This constraint shows that when the career concern is su¢ ciently strong, it may be stricter
than the incentive compatibility constraint; thus, the solution may involve r1 chosen by the
CEO as a result of the discontinuous jump created by her career concern. The next question
is exactly when choosing r1 is better than r1, which we proceed to answer now. A necessary
condition is that the rm prefers operating when the CEO chooses the excessive risk level
r1, which holds as long as L  u, which we have already assumed.
There are two cases to consider in which excessive risk taking occurs in equilibrium. In
the rst, satisfying the career concern constraint and having the CEO take the optimal risk
requires giving her stocks more valuable than the rms output (i.e., b1 > 1), which the
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rm cannot a¤ord without incurring a loss. Thus, in such a situation, the rm involuntarily
allows excessive risk taking in equilibrium. If, therefore,
(7) (1  2r1) f (r1)  (1  2r1) f (r1) <
(1  r1)u
2
;
then (CC) is satised only when b1 > 1, which the rm cannot a¤ord without incurring
a loss, and thus we get excessive risk taking in equilibrium. This inequality represents a
situation in which the CEOs career benet of excessive risk taking to hide her type is higher
than the expected return from the project. In such a case, the rm cannot compensate the
CEO for her career benet from excessive risk taking, even if it o¤ers the whole rst-period
return to her. Note that all terms in this inequality are exogenous. Thus, if it holds, then
(CC) cannot hold, and excessive risk taking becomes imperative.
In the second case in which there is excessive risk taking in equilibrium, having the
CEO take optimal risk is less protable than letting her take excessive risk. Thus, the
rm voluntarily allows excessive risk taking.15 This time, (CC) is satised, which requires
providing an amount of stock ownership that satises b1  (u(1   r1))=(2[(1   2r1)f(r1)  
(1  2r1)f(r1)]). Hence, the lowest possible stock compensation, b1y1(; r1), is given by the
following amount:
(8) 
 :=
u (1  r1)

 + (1  2r1) f (r1)

2 [(1  2r1) f (r1)  (1  2r1) f (r1)]
:
Then, if (1 2r1)f(r1) 
 < (1 2r1)f(r1) u, the rm voluntarily allows the CEO to take
excessive risk. The left-hand side of this inequality is the prot of the rm in case of optimal
risk taking and the right-hand side is that in case of excessive risk taking. Reorganizing it
15. In a related vein, Bebchuk and Spamann (2010) also mentions that even after eliminating the excessive
risk from the perspective of the common shareholders in banks, there may still remain excessive risk from
the perspective of the society because common shareholders are not concerned about preferred shareholders,
bondholders, depositors, and tax payers. We get our result for a di¤erent reason because we do not have
any of these third parties in the model.
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yields a condition that looks similar to (7):
(9) (1  2r1) f (r1)  (1  2r1) f (r1) < 
  u:
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Excessive risk taking / two-type) Suppose that the di¤erence be-
tween the abilities is intermediate (i.e., 2f(1=2)  H   L < 2f(1)). The rm involuntarily
allows the CEO to take excessive risk if (7) holds. It voluntarily allows the CEO to take
excessive risk if (9) holds.
The crucial point here is that excessive risk taking is possible even under an optimal
compensation contract. If there is excessive risk taking, the optimal contract is given by
b1 > 0, and a1 = u   b1[ + f(r1)(1   2r1)]. In the involuntary case, as shown in (7), it is
optimal for the CEO to take excessive risk if the expected loss in output that arises from
excessive risk taking is less than the career benet obtained from excessive risk taking. In
the voluntary case, as shown in (9), the benet of decreasing risk to the optimal level is less
than the cost of compensating the CEO to let her take the optimal risk.
Figure I
Excessive vs. Optimal Risk Taking in Equilibrium
Figure I provides a graphical intuition for excessive risk taking. It shows the expected
payo¤ of the CEO from risk for any risk level chosen. Her payo¤ is increasing up to the
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optimal risk level r1 at point O, and then it is ever decreasing unless her career concern kicks
in, which is where her payo¤discontinuously jumps up to point E. If this point is above point
O, as in Panel A, then the CEO nds it optimal to take excessive risk. This is because the
decrease in her rst-period compensation due to not taking the optimal risk is less than the
career benet she obtains by minimizing her layo¤ risk by taking excessive risk. However,
if it turns out that point E is below point O, as in Panel B, the CEO takes the optimal
risk. It is noteworthy that risk level r1 means choosing a negative NPV project in terms
of the return from risk. Thus, the risk alone contributes negatively to the rm output in
equilibrium, but the return from managerial ability absorbs the loss.16
We close this section with some comments on the structure of the model and robustness
of the results under di¤erent specications.
The fact that there is just one point jumping up discontinuously as a result of career
concern in Figure I is an artifact of our two-type specication. Nevertheless, as we show in
Section IV, the same mechanism works when we have a continuum of types, in which case
there is a mass of points jumping up and their local maximizer gives us the new r1. If it is
also the global maximizer (as in Panel A of Figure I), then there is excessive risk taking in
equilibrium. Otherwise, the CEO takes the optimal risk (as in Panel B of Figure I).
In our setting, any linear combination of xed wage and stock ownership is allowed in
the optimal compensation contract. At this point, one concern would be if other types of
frequently observed compensation contracts work. In Footnote 9, we argued the reasons for
which neglecting stock options is harmless. We now explain why bonus contracts may not
prevent excessive risk taking in our setting as long as sabotaging output is allowed. A bonus
contract pays a xed sum if the output is above a certain threshold. Suppose, for example,
the rm promises to pay a xed bonus equal to u if the CEO obtains H + f(r1), H   f(r1),
16. Palomino and Prat (2003) provide a similar gure representing the set of risky portfolios. They
mention that the textbook analysis shows only the increasing part of the gure as the decreasing part
involves dominated strategies. However, those risk levels are in fact chosen in their analysis as well as ours.
21
L + f(r

1), or L   f(r1) and zero otherwise. The CEO is still red if her assessed ability
is below average. Then, she may take excessive risk r1, and if she obtains H + f(r1), she
can sabotage the output (perhaps by selling it with too low a price) and make it appear as
if she took the optimal risk level r1. Moreover, if one of the parties were risk averse, bonus
contracts would not be optimal since they do not involve optimal risk sharing.
Our main results are independent of bilateral risk neutrality. First, unlike the bilateral
risk-neutrality case of a standard hidden action problem, the career concern can be so strong
that even providing the output of the rst period to the CEO may not prevent her from
taking excessive risk. Thus, no contract can prevent excessive risk in such a case. The
analogy would be a young fund manager who may take excessive risk in managing her own
portfolio as a result of her concern that if she does not perform well now she might not
receive outside funds in the future. Second, as shown in Appendix A.1, the results remain
qualitatively the same even when the CEO is risk averse.
The CEOs possibility of a¤ecting a ring decision with her choice of risk implies behav-
ior consistent with behavioral nances concept of CEO overcondence. This literature is
based on the hypothesis that many CEOs tend to think that they are better than the aver-
age (Malmendier and Tate 2005), and this leads them to be more likely to attribute good
outcomes to their managerial ability or style. Hence, the literature argues that overcondent
managers overestimate their abilities and underestimate the probability of failure, so their
investment decisions are riskier than is ideal. In our setting, each CEO rationally estimates
her ability and the probability of failure, but by taking excessive risk, tries to ensure that
the market overestimates her ability. Hence, our model provides a rational foundation for
CEO overcondence.
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IV. Continuum of Types
The basic insight we get from the two-type analysis of the previous section is that the best
strategy for a CEO who does not know her ability is to choose the risk level at which the
bad-state output of a high-ability CEO coincides with the good-state output of a low-ability
CEO. This strategy decreases the outputs informativeness about the CEOs ability and
thus maximizes her probability of keeping her position in the second period. Under certain
conditions, having outputs coincide may require excessive risk taking in equilibrium. This
section extends this line of reasoning to a continuum of CEO types. Our analysis also predicts
an inversed U-shaped relationship between unobservable ability and the probability of being
red: while the above-average CEOs do not face any layo¤ risk, among the below-average
CEOs, higher-ability ones are certainly red while lower-ability ones are red only with some
probability.
The optimal ring rule, derived in Corollary 1, and the optimal second-period compen-
sation contract, which gives the CEO her reservation payo¤ in the second period, continue
to apply in this section. Thus, as in the two-type case, the basic mechanism of the model
works as follows. Given that the CEO is paid her reservation payo¤ in the second period,
she trades o¤ the decrease in her layo¤ risk in the second period by taking excessive risk in
the rst period for the increase in her expected compensation in the rst period by taking
optimal risk. There are robust instances in which the former e¤ect dominates the latter in
expected payo¤, and thus we get excessive risk taking in equilibrium, either by the rms
consent or against its will.
We shall now talk about the range of abilitiesrather than the di¤erence between the
two abilities,as there is now a continuum of abilities rather than just two. In particular, we
assume that managerial abilities are uniformly distributed on the interval [L; H ] with mean
. Just as in the two-type world, it turns out that there are three possible cases to consider
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in terms of the range of abilities (high, intermediate, and low), and we nd excessive risk
taking in equilibrium only for the intermediate range of abilities. For brevity, we state only
the results for the other two cases in the following lemma, leaving the detailed analysis to
Appendix A.2.
Lemma 4 (Cases 1 and 3) When there is a high (i.e., H   L  4f(1)) or low (i.e.,
H L < 2f(1=2)) range of abilities in the CEO labor market, the CEO chooses the optimal
risk, r1 < 1=2, in equilibrium. Her probability of being red is 1=2.
Now, consider Case 2 in which there is an intermediate range of abilities in the CEO labor
market (i.e., 2f(1=2)  H   L < 4f(1)). This time, we proceed by the guess-and-verify
method. We make the educated guess that the CEO chooses an r1 such that
(10) 4r1f (r1) = H   L
is satised. This is the risk level that guarantees that even the worst type is able to overlap
her good-state output with the bad-state output of an above-average CEO. The subsequent
analysis proceeds as follows. Assuming r1 to be the equilibrium risk level, we rst derive
the probability of being red. Then, in Appendix A.3, we prove that r1 is indeed the risk
level that minimizes the probability of being red. Finally, we show that minimizing the
probability of being red can indeed be an equilibrium under certain conditions.
Figure II
The Partition of CEO Types in Case 2
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Figure II shows the partition of CEOs on the ability distribution. The partitions are
denoted by A, B, C, and D. The ability range of this case guarantees that, given r1, there is
a 00-type whose bad-state output coincides with the good-state output of the worst type, L,
and the rms expectation between these two types is exactly  (that is, L+f(r1) = 00 f(r1)
and (1 r1)L+r100 = ). They also guarantee that there is a 0-type whose good-state output
coincides with the bad-state output of the best type, H (that is, 0 + f(r1) = H   f(r1)).
Of course, the expectation between these two types must be higher than .
Figure II provides the distance between the particular types mentioned in the previous
paragraph. Eq. (10) implies that the distance between L and  and the distance between 
and H are both 2r1f(r1) because  is the mean of the uniform distribution. Moreover, from
the specications provided in the previous paragraph, one can easily nd that the distance
between  and 00 is 2(1  r1)f(r1). Thus, the distance between 00 and H is 2(2r1  1)f(r1),
which is also the distance between L and 0. Consequently, the mass in A is equal to the
mass in D and the mass in B is equal to the mass in C. Note also that r1 is an excessive
risk level because it is higher than 1=2 as a result of the fact that 4r1f(r1) > 2f(1=2) in this
case.
We can now derive the probability of being red in each partition. Because the expecta-
tion between L and 00 is exactly  at r1, the expectation about the ability of a CEO in A
must be higher than  when she obtains the good-state output. Thus, she is rehired in such
an output realization. If she obtains the bad-state output, her ability is inferred and she is
red for certain. Thus, the probability of being red for a CEO in this partition is r1. Next,
consider a CEO in B. With the given risk level, she is not able to overlap her good-state
output with the bad-state output of any existent type and yet her ability is less than ; thus,
she is certainly red in any output realization.
Now consider a CEO in C. Her ability is inferred to be above  because there is no CEO
below  overlapping her good-state output with the bad-state output of this CEO. Thus,
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she is rehired for certain. Finally, the bad-state output of a CEO in D coincides with the
good-state output of a CEO in A, and thus she is rehired in her bad state. She is rehired
for certain in her good state as well, because her output in that state does not coincide with
the bad-state output of any existent type above her. Hence, the probability of being red is
zero for a CEO in this partition.
Given the above analysis, the overall probability of being red is given by p = r1Prf 2
Ag+ 1 Prf 2 Bg+ 0 Prf 2 Cg+ 0 Prf 2 Dg, or
(11) p = r1
2 (2r1   1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
+
2 (1  r1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
=
2r21   2r1 + 1
2r1
;
which is denitely less than 1=2 because r1 > 1=2. What remains to be shown is that r1
is indeed the risk level that minimizes the probability of being red, which we prove in
Appendix A.3 by comparing the p value in (11) with the ones that stem from other possible
risk levels. Thus, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (Case 2) When there is an intermediate range of abilities in the CEO labor mar-
ket (i.e., 2f(1=2)  H   L < 4f(1)), the risk level that minimizes the probability of being
red solves (10), which is an excessive risk level. In this case, the probability of being red
is given by (11).
In the rest of this section, we look for the equilibrium risk level in Case 2. As in the
two-type case, the risk level that solves (10) is not automatically an equilibrium. For that
to be an equilibrium, minimizing the probability of being red must be in the best interest
of the CEO. This may be the case when the CEOs compensation benet by taking optimal
risk is dominated in expected payo¤by the career benet she derives by taking excessive risk
and hence minimizing her probability of being red. However, unlike the two-type case in
which choosing the excessive risk level r1 is the only serious alternative against the optimal
risk level, here the CEO may potentially choose a risk level di¤erent from the one minimizing
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the probability of being red in equilibrium.
As shown in Appendix A.3, choosing a risk level higher than r1, satisfying f(r1) 2
(f(r1); 2r1f(r1)), results in a higher probability of being red than that with r1. At the same
time, because r1 is closer to r1, the rst-period compensation is going to be higher with any
amount of stock-based compensation. Thus, choosing r1 still dominates in expected payo¤
choosing any risk level satisfying f(r1) 2 (f(r1); 2r1f(r1)). However, if the CEO chooses a
risk level satisfying f(r1) 2 (r1f(r1); f(r1)), as shown in the appendix, the probability of
being red is still higher than that with r1, yet this time the rst-period compensation is
going to be higher with any amount of stock-based compensation because this risk level is
closer to r1. As a result, the CEO may prefer to trade o¤ the increased probability of being
red for higher rst-period compensation. Any such risk level chosen in equilibrium still
involves excessive risk taking although it does not minimize the layo¤ risk. Therefore, unlike
the two-type case, excessive risk taking is now an interval rather than just one point (i.e.,
point E of Figure I. The local maximizer of this interval is the most serious candidate against
the optimal risk level, and in fact, if it is also the global maximizer it is the equilibrium.
We now turn to the derivation of the optimal contract. The increase in the probability
of being rehired in the second period by choosing r1 in the rst period is now given by
(12) (1  p (r1))  (1  p (r1)) =
3r1   2r21   1
2r1
:
Thus, the new career concern constraint with r1 is given by
(CC) E

a1 + b1y1
 
; r1
  E a1 + b1y1  ; r1 
(3r1   2r21   1)u
2r1
if f(r1) =2 (r1f(r1); f(r1));
where the left-hand side is the extra compensation that the rm must provide to the CEO for
her expected forgone career benet by choosing an r1 such that f(r1) =2 (r1f(r1); f(r1)), which
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is shown on the right-hand side. Apart from this change in the career concern constraint,
the maximization problem of the rm and its solution remain qualitatively the same. Thus,
we provide the following proposition without a proof.
Proposition 3 (Excessive risk taking / continuum) Suppose there is an intermedi-
ate range of abilities in the CEO labor market (i.e., 2f(1=2)  H   L < 4f(1)). The rm
involuntarily allows the CEO to take excessive risk if
(13) f (r1) (1  2r1)  f (r1) (1  2r1) <
(3r1   2r21   1)u
2r1
:
It voluntarily allows the CEO to take excessive risk if
(14) f (r1) (1  2r1)  f (r1) (1  2r1) <
(3r1   2r21   1)

f (r1) (1  2r1) + 

u
2r1 [f (r1) (1  2r1)  f (r1) (1  2r1)]
  u:
In both cases, the equilibrium risk level r1 satises f(r1) 2 (r1f(r1); f(r1)], where r1 is dened
by (10).
Eqs. (13) and (14) are respectively the counterparts of (7) and (9) in the continuum
of types case. Note that if these equations hold for r1 and if another risk level satisfying
f(r1) 2 (r1f(r1); f(r1)] dominates r1, then these conditions hold for that risk level as well.
Thus, the proposition applies for any risk level in that interval, not just for r1. The intuitions
for (13) and (14) are the same as those provided for Proposition 2. Eq. (13) says that the
career benet the CEO derives from excessive risk taking is higher than the compensation
benet she derives in the rst period by taking optimal risk, even when she is o¤ered the
whole rst-period return. Thus, the rm cannot design a linear compensation contract that
implements the optimal risk, even if it wants to do so. Eq. (14) gives the condition under
which the expected prot of the rm is higher with excessive risk than that with optimal
risk. As in the two-type case, one can easily see that none of our results stems from our
assumption that the CEO is risk neutral.
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So far, we have shown that all results of the two-type case extend to the continuum of
types case. This case also provides an important prediction that we do not have in the
two-type case. Consider a CEO whose ability is below  in Figure II. If she is in A, then
she is able to overlap her good-state output with the bad-state output of an above-average
CEO; thus she is not red in such a state. However, if she is in B, then she is not able to
overlap her good-state output with the bad-state output of any existent type in the ability
distribution. As a result, a CEO in B is red for certain whereas one in A is red only with
probability r1, which means that, among those who are below average, a worse type is less
likely to be red than a better type. However, those who are in C and D, all of whom are
above average, are not red in any case. Thus, there is an inverse U-shaped relationship
between unobserved ability and the probability of being red.
Proposition 4 (Ability and layoff risk) There is an inverse U-shaped relationship
between the unobserved ability and the probability of being red.
The intuition for this result is as follows. By taking risk, a lower-ability CEO can disguise
her type more convincingly because her good-state output is not going to be very high
anyway. Hence, she has some chance of successfully substituting the return from managerial
ability with the return from risk. The rm is skeptical to some extent, but it is not 100%
sure if the CEO is below average ability or not. A higher-ability (but still below average)
CEO is also able to do the same substitution, but this time the observed output is so high
that the rm believes that there is no way that this CEO is above average ability. That
is, if the CEO ends up with an unbelievably high output, then the rm is certain that this
output is coming from a lucky below-average type who gambled and thus res her without
hesitation.
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V. Asymmetric Information
This section relaxes our information assumptions by assuming that CEOs privately know
their abilities in the two-type setting. Now that CEOs know their abilities, di¤erent types
can choose di¤erent risk levels in equilibrium. The reservation payo¤of a high-ability CEO is
now uH , which satises uH  H , and that of a low-ability CEO is uL, which satises uL  L.
It is natural to assume that uH > uL, considering that high-ability CEOs have higher outside
options. We also make the following assumption, which rules out the possibility of separation
in the second period.
Assumption 1 (No separation) H   L  3(uH   (uL=2)) and L=H  uL=uH .
The two expressions in this assumption ensure that the rm cannot o¤er a contract aimed
only at the low- and high-ability CEOs, respectively.17 Hence, knowing that CEOs have
no career concerns in the second period, the rm o¤ers a pooling compensation contract
that attracts both types. In turn, both CEO types choose the optimal risk level in the
equilibrium, and thus no agency problem arises in this period, as in the previous sections.
Because a pooling contract is o¤ered in the second period, the optimal ring rule derived in
the symmetric-incomplete information model continues to hold in this information setting.
To show the possibility of excessive risk taking in equilibrium, we now turn to the analysis
of the rst period. Allowing for asymmetric information extensively enlarges the strategy
space of the CEOs. In the two-type world, a CEO may choose to overlap the good-state
output of a low-ability CEO with the bad-state output of a high-ability CEO. Now that she
knows her own ability, she can even overlap good states with good states and bad states
with bad states. We rst show that the rms expectation about the CEOs ability is higher
17.Unlike many asymmetric information problems, here the rm may want to attract only the low-ability
CEOs because it may eliminate the moral hazard aspect of the problem. That is, the benet of hiring a
low-ability CEO (who is going to choose optimal risk) with a separating contract may outweigh the benet
of hiring a CEO (who will not choose the optimal risk if she is a low-ability one) with a pooling contract.
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than  in each of these cases. Thus, it is not ex ante clear which one is the best strategy for
the CEO under various conditions.
Lemma 6 (Strategies) Suppose that high-ability CEOs choose the optimal risk level r1.
Consider a low-ability CEO.
1. If she chooses the risk level r1 2 [1   r1; 1), at which her good-state output overlaps with
the bad-state output of a high-ability CEO (i.e., L + f(r1) = y1 = H   f(r1)), then, upon
observing such an output level, the rms expectation about her ability is greater than or equal
to . Her overall probability of being red is r1.
2. If she chooses the risk level r01, at which her good-state output overlaps with the good-state
output of a high-ability CEO, (i.e., L+ f(r01) = y
0
1 = H + f(r

1)), then, upon observing such
an output level, the rms expectation about her ability is greater than or equal to . Her
overall probability of being red is r01.
3. If she chooses the risk level r^1, at which her bad-state output overlaps with the bad-state
output of a high-ability CEO (i.e., L  f(r^1) = y^1 = H   f(r1)), then, upon observing such
an output level, the rms expectation about her ability is greater than or equal to . Her
overall probability of being red is 1  r^1.
The proof is in Appendix A.4. It is obvious that a high-ability CEO is rehired for certain
in the second period in any of the three cases of this lemma. Thus, she will in fact choose the
optimal risk level r1 because this maximizes her rst-period compensation without a¤ecting
her probability of being red.18 However, a low-ability CEOs choice is among r1, r01, r^1, and
r1, depending on the case.
18. There is an exceptional measure-zero case in which the good-state output of low-ability CEOs coincides
with the bad-state output of high-ability CEOs by chance at the optimal risk level (i.e., L + f(r1) =
H   f(r1)). In this case, as we show in Appendix A.5 (Case 6), a high-ability CEO chooses a risk level
arbitrarily close (but not equal) to r1 .
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The strategies dened in Lemma 6 are not always viable. First, none is viable when
H  f(r1)  L+f(1), because in such a case, a low-ability CEO cannot overlap her output
with the output of a high-ability CEO in any state. Second, as the rst part of Lemma 6
suggests, r1 is not an e¤ective strategy for a low-ability CEO when r1 2 [0; 1 r1), because it
does not decrease her probability of being red. Third, choosing r01 is a viable strategy only
if H + f(r1) < L + f(1); otherwise, there exists no r
0
1 overlapping the good-state output of
a low-ability CEO with that of a high-ability CEO. This requires H L 2 (0; f(1) f(r1)).
Fourth, choosing r^1 is a viable strategy only if L f(0) > H f(r1); otherwise, there exists
no r^1 overlapping the bad-state output of a low-ability CEO with that of a high-ability CEO.
This requires H   L 2 (0; f(r1)  f(0)).
The requirements in the above paragraph result in six di¤erent cases in terms of the
di¤erence between the abilities. For brevity, we consider only Case 2 here, in which excessive
risk taking occurs in equilibrium, and leave the analysis of the remaining cases to Appendix
A.5. Case 2 is of particular interest because the CEO employs the same strategy of the
previous sections in this case, namely overlapping the good-state output of a low-ability
CEO with the bad-state output of a high-ability CEO by choosing r1. However, excessive
risk taking is not limited to this case. In fact, there is another case (Case 4) in which
low-ability CEOs may potentially overlap their good-state outputs with those of high-ability
CEOs by choosing the excessive risk level r01.
19
In Case 2, H   L 2 [f(r1) + f(1  r1); f(r1) + f(1)) and thus neither r01 nor r^1 is viable.
Assume, for the moment, that a high-ability CEO chooses the optimal risk level r1. We know
from the rst part of Lemma 6 that the rm rehires the low-ability CEO if she chooses r1
and overlaps her good-state output with the bad-state output of a high-ability CEO. Hence,
the only serious candidate against choosing r1 is choosing r1 in this case. Now, consider
a high-ability CEO. The rm keeps her if it observes the overlapped output. It keeps her
19. In Case 4, low-ability CEOs may even overlap their bad-state outputs with that of high-ability CEOs
by choosing the insu¢ cient risk level r^1.
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even when she produces a di¤erent output, because her ability, which is high, is inferred.
Thus, if she chooses the optimal risk level, her probability of being red is zero regardless of
her output, which means that she has no incentive to deviate from this risk level, as it will
also maximize her rst-period compensation. The rm needs to pay some positive amount
of stock ownership to guarantee this, which it certainly does. This discussion results in the
following lemma.
Lemma 7 (Case 2) If H   L 2 [f(r1) + f(1  r1); f(r1) + f(1)), then high-ability CEOs
choose the optimal risk level r1 in equilibrium and their probability of being red is zero.
Low-ability CEOs choose either the optimal risk level r1, in which case their probability of
being red is one, or the excessive risk level r1 so that their good-state output coincides with
the bad-state output of a high-ability CEO, in which case their probability of being red is r1.
We now show the possibility of excessive risk taking in equilibrium. The rm hires just
one CEO and therefore its contract o¤er must provide at least uH if it wants to contract with
a high-ability CEO. The rst expression in Assumption 1 (i.e., H   L  3(uH   (uL=2)))
ensures that attracting both types is better for the rm than attracting only the low-ability
CEOs. The second expression in Assumption 1 (i.e., L=H  uL=uH) ensures that if both
types choose the optimal risk, then any contract that satises the individual rationality
constraint of a high-ability CEO also satises that of a low-ability CEO. In the case of
excessive risk taking, a low-ability CEO chooses r1, which means that choosing r1 makes
her better o¤ for all compensation schemes than choosing r1. Consequently, if high-ability
CEOs participate in the excessive risk taking case, low-ability CEOs will participate as well.
The career concern constraint of a low-ability CEO guarantees that the extra compen-
sation that she gets by choosing the optimal risk rather than r1 is higher than her career
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benet by choosing r1:
(CC) [a1 + b1L + b1 (1  2rL) f (rL)]  [a1 + b1L + b1 (1  2r1) f (r1)] 
(1  r1) [L + (1  2r

2) f (r

2)]uH
H + (1  2r2) f (r2)
if rL 6= r1:
Here, 1  r1 that appears on the right-hand side is the probability that the CEO keeps her
job and the remaining term is her expected compensation in the second period. Then, if
(15) (1  2r1) f (r1)  (1  2r1) f (r1) < (1  r1)
[L + (1  2r2) f (r2)]uH
H + (1  2r2) f (r2)
is satised, the compensation contract cannot satisfy (CC) for all a1 2 <+ and b 2 [0; 1],
in which case a low-ability CEO chooses r1 rather than r1. Because a high-ability CEO
chooses r1 and a low-ability CEO chooses r1, the expected output of the rm is the same for
all b1 2 (0; 1], and hence the optimal compensation contract is the one that minimizes the
compensation without violating the constraints. The following proposition summarizes our
ndings.
Proposition 5 (Excessive risk taking / asymmetric information) If H   L 2
[f(r1) + f(1  r1); f(r1) + f(1)) and (15) holds, then, in the pooling equilibrium, low-ability
CEOs choose the excessive risk level r1 while high-ability CEOs choose the optimal risk level
r1.
VI. Conclusion
The risk choice of a CEO who is concerned with her career may di¤er from the risk choice
that maximizes the shareholdersreturn or societys social return. The question is in what
way the risk choice will be distorted. The managerial conservatism literature suggests that a
top manager is likely to be less entrepreneurial and take too little risk because she would like
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to oversee the rm with the least amount of problems and the minimum risk of obtaining
bad states; thus this literature advises shareholders to design compensation contracts that
encourage the manager to take higher risk.
In this paper, we provide an alternative. We analyze how CEOs layo¤ risk a¤ects their
risk choice in the rm under optimal contracts and optimal ring decisions. We allow for any
linear combination of xed-wage and stock compensation and show that there are market
structures in which explicit incentives are not helpful in preventing CEOs from taking exces-
sive risk. Because a CEO is replaced by a new CEO if her expected ability is below average,
in trying to limit her layo¤ risk, she chooses a risk level that minimizes the informativeness
of the rst-period output about her unknown ability. In our setting, this can be achieved
with excessive risk taking when the range of managerial abilities is neither too high nor too
low. The CEO increases the risk until the good-state output when she turns out to be a
low-ability type coincides with the bad-state output when she turns out to be a high-ability
type.
Our results stem from the novel mechanism in which CEOs can inuence the probabilities
of states by choosing their risk level. In particular, taking higher risk makes the bad state
more likely. Hence, while the rm foresees that the CEO will take excessive risk, once it
observes the overlapped output level, it has to statistically infer that this is more likely to
be the output of a high-ability CEO who is in the bad state than the output of a low-ability
CEO who is in the good state, as the bad state is more likely with excessive risk taking.
Although the rm is not fooled by the actions of the CEO, its expectation about the CEOs
ability is that it is above average, despite the fact that each type is equally likely in the
population.
Whether there is excessive or too little risk in the market is obviously a sector-specic
question. A president of a university may opt for a quiet life while a surgeon may push for
surgery even though it is not entirely necessary. We believe that the banking industry, or the
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nancial sector in general, is an example of excessive risk taking. The structure of nancial
markets are so complicated that shareholders cannot entirely and precisely evaluate whether
the observed return is due to the CEOs ability or to pure luck. Using nancial derivatives,
CEOs can simply gamble on anything and possibly get rewarded for taking massive risks for
short-term revenues. For one reason or another, there is a mismatch between the preferences
of shareholders and CEOs, and we believe that there always will be.
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A.1. Risk-averse CEO
This appendix shows that the possibility of excessive risk taking is not coming from the
assumption of bilateral risk neutrality. Assume, for the sake of the argument, that the rm
continues to be risk neutral but the CEO becomes risk averse, and we are in Case 2 of the
two-type world. Then, the rst-period maximization problem of the rm is
max
a1;b1;r1
 + (1  2r1) f (r1) 
 
a1 + b1y1
 
; r1

(A.1)
s:t:
E

u
 
a1 + b1y1
 
; r1
  u(IR)
r1 2 arg maxE

u
 
a1 + b1y1
 
; r^1

(IC)
E

u
 
a1 + b1y1
 
; r1
  E u  a1 + b1y1  ; r1  (1  r1)u
2
if r1 6= r1;(CC)
where the constraints are respectively the individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and
career concern constraints; u() is a concave utility function; and
(A.2) E

u
 
a1 + b1y1
 
; r1

=
1  r
2
[u (a1 + b1 (L + f (r1))) + u (a1 + b1 (H + f (r1)))]
+
r
2
[u (a1 + b1 (L   f (r1))) + u (a1 + b1 (H   f (r1)))] :
When b1 = 0, then we have E[u(a1 + b1y1(; r1))] = u(a1) for all r 2 [0; 1]. Thus, (CC)
is not satised when b1 = 0. Now, assume that
(A.3) E[u
 
y
 
; ~r1

]  E[u  y  ; r1] < (1  r1)u
2
;
2
where ~r1 is a risk level that maximizes the CEOs rst-period payo¤. This inequality means
that (CC) cannot be satised when a1 = 0 and b1 = 1. Then, it cannot be satised for
all b1 2 [0; 1], either, because E[u(a1 + b1y1(; r1))] is a continuous function. Thus, there is
excessive risk taking whenever (A.3) is satised.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 4
Case 1 (H   L  4f(1)): Let us consider each possible r1 2 [0; 1] in turn. If r1 = 0, then
the output will be  + f(0) for certain, in which case the rm infers the ability of the CEO
from the output. Thus, she is red only when it turns out that her ability is less than , which
implies a probability of being red of 1=2. Similarly, if r1 = 1, then the output will be  f(1)
for certain, and once again the rm perfectly infers the ability, which implies a probability of
being red of 1=2. If the CEO chooses r1 2 (0; 1), then there must be two (interior) types 0
and 00 such that the good-state output realization of the 0-type coincides with the bad-state
output realization of the 00-type (i.e., 0 + f(r1) = 00   f(r1)), and the rms expectation
about the CEOs ability after observing this output is  (i.e., (1  r1) 0 + r100 = ). Then,
one can easily nd that 0 =    2r1f(r1) and 00 =  + 2(1   r1)f(r1) for any risk choice
r1 2 (0; 1).
Figure III
The Partition of CEO Types in Case 1
Figure III shows the partition of CEOs on the ability distribution when the risk level
is r1 2 (0; 1). Because H   L  4f(1), one can easily show that    2f(r1) > L, which
implies that the mass of CEOs in A is larger than that in C. Thus, there is a subpartition
of A = A1 [ A2 such that the mass in A2 is equal to the mass in C and A1 is the residual
3
partition. Similarly, one can show that + 2f(r1) < H for all r1 2 (0; 1) and thus the mass
of CEOs in D is higher than that in B. Hence, there is a subpartition of D = D1 [D2 such
that the mass in D1 is equal to the mass in B and D2 is the residual partition.
Given r1, the good-state output realization of a CEO in A1 coincides with the bad-state
output realization of a below-average CEO, which means that the expectation about her
ability is always lower than  regardless of the state. However, given r1, the bad-state
output realization of a CEO in D2 does not coincide with the good-state output realization
of any below-average CEO. Thus, the expectation about her ability is always higher than 
regardless of the state.
We can now derive the probability of being red in each partition. If the CEO is in A1,
then she is red for certain because the rm knows that her ability is below average for any
output realization. On the other hand, if the CEO is in A2, her good-state output coincides
with the bad-state output of a CEO in C. If she is in the bad state, the rm infers that her
ability is less than  and res her. If she is in the good state, the rm still res her, because
the expectation of 0 matching with 00 is  and thus the expectation of any  2 A2 matching
with any  2 C must be lower than .
If the CEO is in B, her good-state output coincides with the bad-state output of a CEO
in D1 and the expectation about her ability is higher than , which means that she is not
red in case of the good state. However, she is red if she is in the bad state, as the rm
infers that her ability must be less than . Thus, her probability of being red is r1 if she is
in this partition. Next, consider a CEO in C. Her bad-state output coincides with that of
a CEO in A2 and thus her expected ability is less than , which means that she is red in
such a state. Otherwise, she is in the good state in which case her ability is inferred to be
higher than  and thus the rm keeps her for certain. Thus, the probability of being red in
this partition is also r1.
Now consider a CEO in D1. The bad-state output realization of a CEO in this partition
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coincides with the good-state output realization of one in B, and the expectation about her
ability is higher than , which means that she is not red in such a state. She is not red
even when she is in the good state because the rm infers that her ability is higher than .
Thus, a CEO in D1 is rehired for certain. Finally, a CEO in D2 is also rehired for certain,
because, as previously argued, her ability is perfectly inferred.
Given the above analysis, the overall probability of being red is given by p = 1Prf 2
Ag+ r1  Prf 2 Bg+ r1  Prf 2 Cg+ 0 Prf 2 Dg, or
(A.4) p =
   L   2r1f (r1)
H   L + r1
2r1f (r1)
H   L + r1
2 (1  r1) f (r1)
H   L =
1
2
:
Because the CEO faces the same probability of being red for any choice of r1, she chooses
the optimal risk level r1 as it is the best choice in terms of her rst-period compensation, as
long as she is given some stock ownership. Thus, she chooses the optimal risk in equilibrium.
Case 3 (H   L < 2f(1=2)): If H   L  2f(0), outputs do not match in any case and
thus the probability of being red cannot be lower than 1=2. Now, consider the remaining
part of the interval (i.e., 2f(0) < H   L < 2f(1=2)). This time, one can easily obtain
(11) once again by going through exactly the same calculations as in Case 2. Yet, this time,
H   L = 4r1f(r1) < 2f(1=2) which implies r1 < 1=2. Therefore, we have p = 1=2, which
means that the minimum probability of ring for any risk choice is not less than the one
with the optimal risk level r1. But, then, because r

1 is both the risk level that maximizes the
rst-period compensation and the risk level that minimizes the probability of being red, it
is the equilibrium risk level.
A.3. The Probability of Being Fired with a Continuum of Types
This appendix shows that the guessed risk level r1 of Case 2 of the continuum of types is
indeed the risk level that minimizes the probability of being red. We prove this claim in
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two steps. In the rst step, we show that the probability of being red is higher for any
r1 2 [0; r1) than the one with r1. In the second step, we prove the same thing for any (r1; 1].
Step 1: Show that p(r1) > p(r1) for all r1 2 [0; r1).
Subcase i: Suppose that the risk level satises f(r1) = r1f(r1) < f(r1). Then, there
must be a 0-type and a 00-type such that the good-state output of the 0-type coincides with
the bad-state output of the 00-type, and thus 0 = L + 2(1  r1)f(r1) and 00 = 0 + 2f(r1),
and the expectation about them is (1  r1)0 + r100 = .
Figure IV
The Partition of CEO Types in Case 2 (Subcase i of Step 1)
Figure IV portrays the subcase. Note that the mass in A is equal to the mass in C, and
the mass in B is equal to the mass in D. It is easy to see that the probability of being red
is one in A, r1 in B and C, and zero in D. Therefore, the overall probability of being red is
(A.5) p (r1) =
2 (1  r1) f (r1)
4f (r1)
+
2r1f (r1)
4f (r1)
=
1
2
;
which is obviously higher than p(r1).
Subcase ii: Suppose that the risk level satises f(r1) < r1f(r1) < f(r1). Then, there
must be a 0-type and a 00-type such that the good-state output of the 0-type coincides
with the bad-state output of the 00-type, and thus 0 = L + 2r1f(r1)   2r1f(r1) and 00 =
0 + 2f(r1), and the expectation about them is (1  r1)0 + r100 = .
Figure V portrays the subcase. Unlike Subcase i, in this subcase, the mass in A is larger
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Figure V
The Partition of CEO Types in Case 2 (Subcase ii of Step 1)
than the mass in C because 2r1f(r1) > 2f(r1) and hence 2r1f(r1) 2r1f(r1) > 2(1 r1)f(r1).
For the same reason, 2r1f(r1)  2(1  r1)f(r1) > 2r1f(r1) and hence the mass in D is larger
than the mass in B. It is easy to see that the probability of being red is one in A, r1 in B
and C, and zero in D. Therefore, the overall probability of being red is
(A.6)
2r1f (r1)  2r1f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
+ r1
2f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
=
1
2
;
which is obviously higher than p(r1).
Subcase iii: Suppose that the risk level satises r1f(r1) < f(r1) < f(r1). Then,
there must be a 0-type, a 00-type, a 000-type, and a 0000-type such that 0 =    2r1f(r1),
00 = H   2f(r1), 000 = L + 2f(r1), and 0000 =  + 2(1   r1)f(r1), as shown in Figure VI.
Then, the mass in A is equal to the mass in E, the mass in C is equal to the mass in D,
and the mass in B is equal to the mass in F . Then, it is easy to see that the probability of
being red is one in A and C, r1 in B and E, and zero in D and F .
Figure VI
The Partition of CEO Types in Case 2 (Subcase iii of Step 1)
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The probabilities of being red in each partition are given by
Pr f 2 Ag = Pr f 2 Eg = 2r1f (r1)  2r1f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
(A.7)
Pr f 2 Bg = Pr f 2 Fg = 2r1f (r1)  2 (1  r1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
(A.8)
Pr f 2 Cg = Pr f 2 Dg = 2f (r1)  2r1f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
:(A.9)
Therefore, the overall probability of being red is
p (r1) =
2r1f (r1)  2r1f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
+ r1
2r1f (r1)  2 (1  r1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
(A.10)
+
2f (r1)  2r1f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
+ r1
2r1f (r1)  2r1f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
=
4r1r1f (r1)  2 (2r1   1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
:
The CEO follows this strategy if she can decrease her probability of being red to a level
less than 1=2 by doing so:
(A.11)
4r1r1f (r1)  2 (2r1   1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
<
1
2
or 2r1r1f(r1)  (2r1 1)f(r1) < r1f(r1). This is satised when (2r1 1)[r1f(r1) f(r1)] < 0,
or r1 > 1=2. Now, we need to show that this probability of being red is higher than p(r1).
It is so if
(A.12)
4r1r1f (r1)  2 (2r1   1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
>
2r21   2r1 + 1
2r1
;
or (4r1r1   4r21 + 4r1   2)f(r1) > 2(2r1   1)f(r1). Because f(r1) > f(r1), this holds when
4r1r1   4r21 + 4r1   2 > 2(2r1   1), or (1  r1) (r1   r1) > 0, which is always satised. Thus,
p(r1) > p(r1). This completes the proof of the claim that that p(r1) > p(r1) for all r1 2 [0; r1).
Step 2: Show that p(r1) > p(r1) for all r1 2 (r1; 1].
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Subcase i: Suppose that the risk level satises f(r1) < f(r1) = (H   L)=2. Then,
the good-state output of the worst type coincides with the bad-state output of the best
type, L + f(r1) = H   f(r1). This means that  + f(r1) > H   f(r1) for all  2 (L; ).
Thus, the rm infers the ability of the CEO when it observes any output level di¤erent from
the overlapped output level, and thus res the CEO with probability 1=2. If it observes the
overlapped output level, it res the CEO with probability r1=2. Thus, the overall probability
of being red is approximately 1=2 and denitely higher than p(r1).
Subcase ii: Suppose that the risk level satises f(r1) < (H   L)=2 < f(r1). Then,
we have  + f(r1) > H   f(r1) for all  2 [L; ), which means that the output realization
perfectly signals the ability of a CEO. Thus, the overall probability of being red is 1=2,
which is higher than p(r1).
Subcase iii: Suppose that the risk level satises f(r1) < f(r1) < (H   L)=2. Then,
there must be a 0-type and a 00-type such that 0 = H   2f(r1) and 00 = L + 2f(r1),
as shown in Figure VII. The good-state output of the L-type (0-type) coincides with the
bad-state output of the 00-type (H-type). However, the expectation for both pairs is above
. It is easy to see that the probability of being red is r1 in A, one in B, and zero in C and
D.
Figure VII
The Partition of CEO Types in Case 2 (Subcase iii of Step 2)
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The overall probability of being red is given by
p (r1) = r1
4r1f (r1)  2f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
+
2f (r1)  2r1f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
(A.13)
=
2 (2r1   1) r1f (r1) + 2 (1  r1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
:
Remember that
(A.14) p (r1) =
2 (2r1   1) r1f (r1) + 2 (1  r1) f (r1)
4r1f (r1)
:
Thus, p(r1) > p(r1) if 2(2r1  1)r1f(r1) + 2(1  r1)f(r1) > 2(2r1  1)r1f(r1) + 2(1  r1)f(r1),
which boils down to 4(r1   r1)r1f(r1) + 2(1   r1)f(r1)   2(1   r1)f(r1) > 0. Because
f(r1) < f(r1), let f(r1) = f(r1) +  where   0. Then, we have 4(r1   r1)r1f(r1) + 2(1  
r1)(f(r1)+) 2(1 r1)f(r1) > 0. This boils down to 2(r1 r1)(2r1 1)f(r1)+2(1 r1) > 0,
which always holds because r1 > 1=2. Hence, p(r1) > p(r1). This completes the proof of the
claim that p(r1) > p(r1) for all r1 2 (r1; 1].
A.4. Proof of Lemma 6
1. When the rm observes y1, its expectation about the ability of the CEO will be
(A.15) E [i j y1] =

1  r1
r1 + 1  r1

L +

r1
r1 + 1  r1

H :
This is greater than or equal to  = (1=2)L + (1=2)H i¤ (1  r1)=(r1 + 1  r1)  1=2, which
holds for all r1 2 [1   r1; 1). Therefore, the rm keeps her in such a state, which happens
with probability 1  r1; otherwise she is red, which happens with probability r1.
2. When the rm observes y01, its expectation about the ability of the CEO will be
(A.16) E [i j y01] =

1  r01
1  r1 + 1  r01

L +

1  r1
1  r1 + 1  r01

H ;
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This is greater than or equal to  = (1=2)L + (1=2)H if (1   r01)=(1   r1 + 1   r01)  1=2,
which holds when r01  r1. Note that f(r01)   f(r1) = H   L > 0 in this case. Hence,
f(r01) > f(r

1), which implies that r
0
1 > r

1. Therefore, the rm keeps her in such a state,
which happens with probability 1 r01; otherwise she is red, which happens with probability
r01.
3. When the rm observes y^1, its expectation about the ability of the CEO will be
(A.17) E [i j y^1] =

r^1
r1 + r^1

L +

r1
r1 + r^1

H ;
This is greater than or equal to  = (1=2)L + (1=2)H if (r^1)=(r1 + r^1)  1=2, which holds
when r^1  r1. Note that f(r1)   f(r^1) = H   L > 0 in this case. Hence, f(r1) > f(r^1),
which implies that r^1 < r1. Therefore, the rm keeps her in such a state, which happens
with probability r^1; otherwise she is red, which happens with probability 1  r^1.
A.5. Cases under Asymmetric Information
As Lemma 6 suggests, in trying to minimize the probability of being red, the CEO can
choose three possible risk levels: r1, r01, and r^1. The motivation of a low-ability CEO in
choosing these risk levels is to disguise her type with her risk choice. If one of these does not
work or current compensation dominates career concern, the CEO chooses the optimal risk
level r1. We have already derived the following feasibility conditions in the text. First, none
of the strategies is viable when H   f(r1)  L + f(1) because in such a case a low-ability
CEO cannot overlap her output with the output of a high-ability CEO in any state. This
forms the lower boundary of Case 1 below. Second, as the rst part of Lemma 6 suggests,
r1 is not an e¤ective strategy for a low-ability CEO when r1 2 (0; 1  r1) because it does not
decrease her probability of being red. This forms the lower boundary of Case 2 below.
Third, choosing r01 is a viable strategy only if H + f(r

1) < L + f(1); otherwise there
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exists no r01 overlapping the good-state output of a low-ability CEO with that of a high-ability
CEO. This requires H   L 2 (0; f(1)  f(r1)). Fourth, choosing r^1 is a viable strategy only
if L  f(0) > H   f(r1); otherwise there exists no r^1 overlapping the bad-state output of a
low-ability CEO with that of a high-ability CEO. This requires H   L 2 (0; f(r1)  f(0)).
This condition and the previous one overlap, but both of these conditions are under the
lower boundary of Case 2, f(r1) + f(1  r1).20 Depending on the technology, the maximum
of these two conditions form the lower boundary of Case 3 below and the minimum of them
forms the upper boundary of Case 4. There is also the exceptional (and measure zero) case
in which H   f(r1) = L + f(r1) by chance, which is Case 6. Below, we state all these
conditions and analyze them one by one.
Case 1 (H   L 2 [f(r1) + f(1);1)): In this case, H   L is so high that a low-ability
CEO is unable to overlap even her good-state output with the bad-state output of a high-
ability CEO even when she takes the maximum risk (i.e., H   f(r1)  L + f(1)). This
implies that a high-ability CEOs output when she chooses the optimal risk is higher than a
low-ability CEOs output for any risk level. This means that the outputs of di¤erent types
cannot overlap, y1(H ; r1) > y1(L; r1), for all r1 2 [0; 1] in all states. Thus, if the high-ability
CEO chooses r1, then the rm infers her ability at the end of the period. As a result, neither
a high-ability CEO nor a low-ability one has career concerns, which means that they choose
the optimal risk r1 in the rst period since it maximizes their rst-period compensation.
Note that the rm needs to pay some positive amount of stock ownership to guarantee this.
Lemma 8 (Case 1) If H   L 2 [f(r1) + f(1);1), then both types choose the optimal risk
level r1 in equilibrium. Outputs do not overlap in any state combination and thus the rm
infers the type of the CEO at the end of the rst period. It res the low-ability CEOs and
rehires the high-ability ones.
Case 2 (H   L 2 [f(r1) + f(1  r1); f(r1) + f(1))): We analyze this case in the text.
20. f(r1)+f(1 r1) is trivially higher than f(r1) f(0). The concavity of the risk-return function implies
that f(r1) + f(1  r1) > f(1), and hence f(r1) + f(1  r1) > f(1)  f(r1) must hold as well.
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Case 3 (H   L 2 [maxff(1)  f(r1); f(r1)  f(0)g; f(r1) + f(1  r1))): The analysis of
this case is trivial because none of the risk levels r1, r01, or r^1 is viable in this case. Hence, the
type of a CEO will be inferred anyway and her probability of being red will be independent
of her risk choice. Consequently, she chooses the optimal risk level in order to maximize her
rst-period compensation. Note that the rm needs to pay some positive amount of stock
ownership to guarantee this.
Lemma 9 (Case 3) If H   L 2 [maxff(1)  f(r1); f(r1)  f(0)g; f(r1) + f(1  r1)), then
both types of CEOs choose the optimal risk level r1 in equilibrium. Outputs do not overlap
in any state combination and thus the rm infers the type of the CEO at the end of the rst
period. It res the low-ability CEOs and rehires the high-ability ones.
Case 4 (H   L 2 [minff(1)  f(r1); f(r1)  f(0)g;maxff(1)  f(r1); f(r1)  f(0)g)):
The analysis of this case is also trivial. If f(1) + f(0) > 2f(r1), then overlapping her good-
state output with that of a high-ability CEO is optimal for a low-ability CEO and thus
she chooses r01. If, however, f(1) + f(0) < 2f(r

1), then overlapping her bad-state output
with that of a high-ability CEO is optimal for a low-ability CEO, and thus she chooses
r^1. Because a high-ability CEO is always rehired, she does not have career concerns and
chooses the optimal risk level to maximize her rst-period compensation. These are the risk
levels that minimize the probability of being red, not necessarily the equilibrium values.
If minimizing the probability of being red is not optimal, a low-ability CEO chooses the
optimal risk level r1. The risk level r
0
1 is higher than the optimal risk level r

1 but the risk-
return function may have positive or negative NPV depending on whether the risk level is
above or below 1=2.
Lemma 10 (Case 4) If H L 2 [minff(1) f(r1); f(r1) f(0)g;maxff(1) f(r1); f(r1) 
f(0)g), then a high-ability CEO chooses the optimal risk level r1 in equilibrium and rehired
for certain in the second period. A low-ability CEO minimizes her probability of being red
by choosing the excessive risk level r01 if f(1) + f(0) > 2f(r

1) and overlap her good-state
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output realization with the good-state output realization of a high-ability CEO. In this case,
she is red with probability r01. She minimizes her probability of being red by choosing the
insu¢ cient risk level r^1 if f(1) + f(0) < 2f(r1) and overlaps her bad-state output realization
with the bad-state output realization of a high-ability CEO. In this case, the rm rehires the
high-ability CEO while it res the low-ability CEO with probability 1  r^1.
Case 5 (H L 2 (0;minff(1) f(r1); f(r1) f(0)g)): If a low-ability CEO chooses r01,
her probability of being red is r0; if she chooses r^1, her probability of being red is 1  r^1.
Hence, the CEO chooses r01 or r^1 in order to minimize her probability of being red. We
know that L + f(r01) = H + f(r

1) and L   f(r^1) = H   f(r1). Thus, r01  1   r^1 if and
only if
(A.18) f 1 (H   L + f (r1)) + f 1 (L   H + f (r1))  1:
However, it might be the case that the CEO still chooses r01 if her compensation benet in the
rst period overweighs her career benet in expected payo¤. However, it turns out that this
is not the case. The compensation of a low-ability CEO is weakly higher with r^1 than with
r01. If the rm o¤ers a xed wage, then evidently her compensations under both risk choices
are equal. Suppose that the rm o¤ers a positive amount of stock ownership. Combining
L+f(r
0
1) = H +f(r

1) and L f(r^1) = H f(r1) gives jf (r^1)  f (r1)j = jf (r01)  f (r1)j,
and because the risk-return function is concave, this implies jr^1   r1j < jr01   r1j. We know
that the expected return is a continuous and concave function in its positive range and that
it is maximized at r1. Thus, expected return decreases as we move away from the r

1. As a
result, the expected return is always higher under r^1 than it is under r01. Hence, if a positive
amount of stock ownership is o¤ered, then the current compensation is higher under r^1 than
it is under r01. This means that we get insu¢ cient risk taking in equilibrium.
Lemma 11 (Case 5) If H   L 2 (0;minff(1)  f(r1); f(r1)  f(0)g), then a high-ability
CEO chooses the optimal risk level r1 whereas a low-ability CEO chooses the insu¢ cient risk
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level r^1 as long as (A.18) is satised. In this case, the low-ability CEO overlaps her bad-state
output with the bad-state output of a high-ability CEO, and the rm rehires the high-ability
CEO while it res the low-ability CEO with probability 1  r^1.
This lemma is a su¢ ciency condition for the insu¢ cient risk choice r^1. If (A.18) is not
satised, whether the CEO chooses r^1 or r01 depends on the exact trade-o¤ between layo¤
risk and current compensation. As a matter of fact, the choice between r^1 and r01 is very
sensitive to the technology. For example, if the risk-return function is linear, then probability
of being red with r01 is lower than that with r^1 and the rst-period compensation is same
for both risk choices. Hence, r01 would certainly dominate r^1.
Case 6 (H   L = 2f(r1)): This is a knife-edge case in which L + f(r1) = y1 =
H   f(r1). When the rm observes y1, its expectation about the type of the CEO will be
E[i j y1] = r1H +(1 r1)L, which is less than  because r1 < 1=2. Therefore, the rm res
the CEO after such an observation. It res the CEO even when it observes y(L; r1) 6= y1
in which case her ability is inferred. Thus, she has no career incentive, which means that
she chooses r1 in the rst period as it maximizes her rst-period compensation. However,
by di¤erentiating her output from the output of a low-ability CEO, a high-ability CEO can
decrease her probability of being red from r1 to zero. As a result, the high-ability CEO
will choose something arbitrarily close (but not equal to) r1. These are the risk levels that
minimize the probability of being red, not necessarily the equilibrium values. If minimizing
the probability of being red is not optimal, she chooses the optimal risk level r1.
Lemma 12 (Case 6) If H f(r1) = L+f(r1), low-ability CEOs take the optimal risk level
r1 whereas high-ability CEOs choose a risk level that is arbitrarily close (but not equal to)
r1. Outputs do not overlap in any state combination and thus the rm infers the type of the
CEO at the end of the rst period. It res the low-ability CEOs and rehires the high-ability
ones.
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